It is as important as flying a plane to handle emergency and unusual situations and it is the continuation of the learning process related to that aircraft. Flight training cannot teach pilots how to handle every situation they may encounter. With this in mind, pilots are expected to compare different situations with their own and produce solutions. Pilots can evaluate accordingly and make the right decisions.
Boeing 737 Max aircraft have been unable to fly since March following two fatal accidents. The company decided that the maneuverability enhancement system resembles an illegal electrical situation in the aircraft, and that pilots do not need to know the presence of MCAS. If there had been no evidence of MCAS in the Lion Air accident in November 2018, nothing about it would have been mentioned.
The company was convinced that the MCAS error would fail once in the lifetime of the aircraft. He also thought that uncontrolled system entrances by teams could be easily noticed and resolved by flight controls. The problem is that aviation does not work through assumptions.
The National Transport Safety Board said that Boeing ignored various human factor consequences, based on the actions they took after the second Max accident in March. He forwarded these to the FAA in a report. The Board found that Boeing should make improvements to its design assessment processes, and that these processes, which are currently designed or approved for future aircraft designs, should be reconsidered. Basically, the board believes that Boeing has missed some key human factor data proving that pilots can handle so many emergencies in just one go.
The NTSB suggests that there is no prioritization of a malfunction indicator, which may distract the distracted pilot and confuse him, and that the pilot recognition and design certification process is not well managed.
Just like other aircraft, the B737 Max is equipped with various crew warning systems. This team warning system guides the team to comply with design requirements and supports the team to take actions identified in emergency situations through procedures. Unfortunately, Boeing assumed that there would be no MCAS failure and would not affect the team.
Unfortunately, both Boeing accidents reported that the teams were unable to identify the problem immediately because the error data also caused different warnings and distracted the team before departure. It was stated that multiple warnings and indicators increase the workload of pilots and may cause negative team reactions in emergencies. In addition, evaluations of the MCAS failure and pilot responses to the circumstances occurred did not match Boeing’s assumptions.
Boeing said that as part of the MCAS-related hazard assessment, he did not assess possible warnings and indicators related to MCAS, although he did assess the likelihood of being commanded. Therefore, neither Boeing’s system security assessment nor simulator tests were able to predict which procedures should be prioritized when responding to an unwanted MCAS process.
As a result, the board requested the FAA to evaluate separately the pilot recognition and response effects of flight failure warning indicators and warnings. He wanted the aircraft to be redesigned if necessary. In addition, the pilot’s response to failures to measure and prioritize the study should be done.
In short, there are several question marks about the Boeing 737 Max and there is no timetable for solving the problem. The pressure on the manufacturer continues to increase day by day.